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establish proper limits for recovery within the Workmen's Compensation Act. Yet, it certainly was not intended that legitimate claims
should fail merely on the ground that there were no eyewitnesses,
or that those employees who did witness the accident refuse to testify
for fear of losing their own jobs or pensions. It was not anticipated
that the individual's right to compensation would depend upon an
expensive and time consuming skirmish of lawyers and doctors. A
rebuttable presumption in favor of the claimant would be more
equitable to the employee. It would prevent the denial of valid claims
on the basis of embattled principles of common law doctrine applied
by the courts under the guise of legislative intent. At the same time,
it would allow the employer to submit evidence which could justify
a bar to the claimant's recovery. In the final analysis, the Colorado Supreme Court should not allow interpretation of the Workmen's
Compensation Act to work a denial of legitimate claims by employees
injured while performing their work-related duties, simply because
the event which is the cause of the injury is unwitnessed.
G. Landon Feazell, Jr.*
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

EQUAL PROTECTION -

CLASSIFICATION OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE FOR PURPOSES OF RECOVERING
COSTS OF CONFINEMENT. -

State v. Estate of Burnell, 439 P.2d

38 (Colo. 1968).
Having been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity of the
charge of murder, Arlester L. Burnell was committed to the Colorado
State Hospital's ward for the criminally insane. In subsequent proceedings in the probate court, Burnell was civilly adjudicated a
mental incompetent and an estate was opened. After a period of
time in which funds had accumulated in Burnell's estate, the hospital
filed a claim against the estate for costs of Burnell's care and maintenance, pursuant to a Colorado recovery statute.' The probate court
* The author

wishes to acknowledge the research

and contributions of Mrs. Gladys

Oppenheimer to this Comment.
'Ch. 224, § 1, [19511 Colo. Laws 557, as amended COLO. REv. STAT. ANN §
71-7-1(1) (Supp. 1965). The statute, before the 1964 amendment and relocation,

provided:
Estates liable. - Whenever any person is admitted, committed or transferred
to any public institution of this state, maintained for the care, support, maintenance, education and treatment of insane persons, mentally incompetent persons, criminally insane persons, feeble-minded or epileptic persons, and such
person or persons have real or personal estate or both, the estate of such
person or persons, irrespective of its source, composition or origin, shall be
primarily liable for the payment of the claims of the said public institution for
the care, support, maintenance, education and treatment of said person equal
to the cost per capita per month of care and treatment of other patients in

said institution.
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denied the claim, holding that the statute allowing recovery of
costs from criminally insane persons is unconstitutional as a denial
of equal protection. The court's reasoning was that costs are not
recovered from those who are convicted of crimes, and that there
are insufficient distinctions between the criminally insane and the
criminally convicted to justify unequal treatment under the law.2
On review of the probate court's decision, held, reversed and remanded with instructions to allow the claim. The classification of
criminally insane persons apart from criminally convicted persons
for purposes of recovery by the state of costs of care and maintenance during commitment does not violate the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, since there are real distinctions in fact between the two classes.3
The scope of this Comment will be limited to an in-depth analysis of the Burnell decision. Although courts have traditionally upheld the right of the state to recover from the estates of criminally
insane persons the costs of commitment, 4 no case has been decided
dealing directly and precisely with the constitutional proposition
urged in this case, although several decisions have been handed
down dealing with analogous situations which bear upon the issue
raised in Burnell.5 Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court was called
2 In re Estate of Burnell, No. P-31270 (P. Ct. Denver, Dec. 22, 1966).
3

State v. Estate of Burnell, 439 P.2d 38 (Colo.), cert. denied, 89 S.Ct. 46 (1968).

4 See, e.g., Guardianship of Gestner's Estate, 90 Cal. App. 2d 680, 204 P.2d 77 (1949);

Briskman v. Central State Hospital, 264 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. 1954) ; State v. Griffith,
34 Ohio L. Abs. 95, 36 N.E.2d 489 (1941) ; Commonwealth v. Evans, 253 Pa. 524,
98 A. 722 (1916); State v. Ikey's Estate, 84 Vt. 368, 79 A. 850 (1911); In re
Radoll's Guardianship, 222 Wis. 539, 269 N.W. 305 (1936).
5 For instance, Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 379 P.2d 22,
28 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1963) held that the relatives of an insane person could not be
held liable for the costs of confinement of one who is found insane at the time of
arraignment and unable to stand trial. The defendant's plea to the charge of murder
in this case was not guilty by reason of insanity. One of the major grounds for this
decision was:
The enactment and administration of laws providing for sequestration and
treatment of persons in appropriate state institutions - subject of course,
to the constitutional guaranties - who would endanger themselves or others
if at large is a proper state function; being so, it follows that the expense
of providing, operating and maintaining such institutions should (subject
to reasonable exceptions against the inmate or his estate) be borne by the
state.
Id. at 255-56, 379 P.2d at 27-28, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 273-74.
See also People v. Brock, 57 Cal. 2d 644, 649-50, 371 P.2d 296, 299, 21 Cal. Rptr.
560, 563 (1962) in which it was held that "commitment under such circumstances
[arising from a charge of crime and for commission of an act which would be a
crime except for the fact that the actor was laboring under M'Naughton test insanity]
is placed on the same basis as the imprisonment of a defendant found guilty of crime,
insofar as concerns responsibility of relatives for his support in the state institution
in which he is thereafter confined." The Brock decision also held that, by legislative
enactment, a person found not guilty by reason of insanity upon a trial of this issue
was not liable to the state under the recovery statutes. See note 11 infra. Napa State
Hospital v. Yuba County, 138 Cal. 378, 71 P. 450 (1903) and In re Cathey, 55 Cal.
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upon to decide an issue of first impression, without having the benefit of pursuasive authority from other jurisdictions. The resolution
of the issue could therefore have significant repercussions in other
jurisdictions.
However, analysis of the Burnell decision reveals that the holding of the court does not technically stand for the proposition that
the separate classification of criminally insane persons from those
criminally convicted is viable under an equal protection attack; moreover, the decision rests upon a questionable factual assumption and
a misconstruction and misapplication of precedent. The decision is
at best ambiguous and obfuscatory, and it leaves the resolution of
important issues of public policy and constitutional interpretation
resting on a legally and logically unsound basis.
I. ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY

The development of the insanity defense referring to the accountability of a person for his criminal acts is indicative of a trend
2d 679, 361 P.2d 426, 12 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1961) are also to the effect that those
who are mentally ill and those who are charged with a crime, but unable to stand
trial because of present insanity, form a separate and distinct class for purposes of
recovering costs. But see Wagner v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 134 Md.
305, 106 A. 753 (1919).
Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720,
36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964), vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 194, decision on remand,
62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965) appears to stand for the
same proposition as the Hawley case, but extends the equal protection ground to
the relatives of civilly insane persons and has thereby become a significant case in
this area. Most commentators have argued that, despite the language of the California
Supreme Court to the contrary, the Hawley case was not clearly dispositive of the
issue in Kirchner. See 49 CORNELL L.Q. 516 (1964); 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 606
(1965); TenBrock, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 17 STAN. L. REV. 614, 638-46 (1965) ; 16 HASTINGS L.J.
129 (1964); 38 So. CAL. L. REV. 355 (1965). By the same reasoning, Kirchner
cannot be said to bear directly upon the issue presented by the Burnell case.
Kough v. Hoehler, 413 Ill. 409, 109 N.E.2d 177 (1952) is also analogous to
Burnell. Kough held that the legislature may classify criminal patients apart from
noncriminal patients. It is therefore not direct authority for the proposition that the
legislature may not constitutionally classify them together. However, one of the
major grounds for the decision appears to be relevant to the issue in Burnell:
We cannot agree with plaintiff's reasoning that there is no valid basis for
making a distinction between persons who are in the hospital merely for
treatment and those who are imprisoned on account of some criminal charge
or offense and who, if they were in physical and mental health, would be
in the jails or penitentiaries. We think there is a clear basis for distinction.
Inmates against whom there are no criminal charges, or who have been
guilty of no criminal offenses, are in the hospital solely for treatment. Those
who are charged with crime, or who have been convicted of a crime, would
ordinarily be in the jail or penitentiary, but on account of the fact that
there are no facilities there for treating them for their physical and mental
ills they are transferred to the hospitals. Moreover, the public is vitally and
directly interested in those who are in custody. They are in custody for the
protection of the public, when convicted or accused of a crime.
Id. at 416, 109 N.E.2d at 181.
See 54 Ill. B.J. 876 (1966). For further discussion of the law in this area see note 4
supra, notes 11, 29 infra, and Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 363 (1968).
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in our society which proposes a gradual rejection of the concepts
of pure punishment in favor of the allegedly more scientific and
more humane concepts of rehabilitation. 6 One school of penology
would argue that the insanity defense itself appears to be the product of an intellectually mature society which recognizes determinants of human behavior which are beyond the control of the
individual and beyond the capacity of punishment to serve as a
corrective device.7
However, the extent to which the insanity defense conforms to
idealistic conceptions is limited by the actual punitive elements of
the consequences of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. For
instance, the Colorado statutes provide "[ilf the verdict is that the
defendant was insane at the time the alleged offense was committed,
the court shall forthwith commit him to the state hospital at Pueblo,
or such other institution designated by law, there to be confined
and treated until his discharge or conditional release as hereafter
provided ...."S The termination of confinement involves a finding
by the superintendent of the institution, the Colorado Psychopathic
Hospital, and the committing court that the defendant is no longer
insane.9 Arguably, it is possible under these circumstances that the
confinement of a defendant pursuant to a finding of insanity could
exceed in duration his alternative incarceration in the penitentiary
pursuant to a verdict of guilty.
In addition to the punitive aspect of indefinite confinement,
the criminal defendant who is found not guilty by reason of insanity is also made liable through his estate for the costs of his
care and maintenance.1 ° In view of the rehabilitation ethic of our
society and our emerging concepts of societal responsibility for environmentally determined defects in the behavior patterns of members of society, the utilization of recovery statutes such as Colorado's
raises a significant issue of social policy. This issue can be phrased:
Should a person be indefinitely confined in a mental institution
6See generally H.

BARNES,

THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT:

A RECORD OF MAN'S
0. SINGTON, THE OFFENDERS:
THE CASE AGAINST LEGAL VENGEANCE (1957); G. ZILBOORG, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT (1959). But cf. Goldstein & Katz, Abolish
INHUMANITY

TO MAN

(1930);

G.

PLAYFAIR &

the Insanity Defense-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (1963).
7 For a discussion of the freedom-determinism issue and its relationship to criminal
law and penology see S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: COLD WAR OR ENTENTE
CORDIALE? 5-40
8

ANN. § 39-8-4(2)
9

(1962).

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4(2) (a)

(Supp. 1965), amending COLO. REV. STAT.

(1963).

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-8-4(3-7) (Supp. 1965), amending COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 39-8-4(3-5) (1963).
10
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-7-1(1) (Supp. 1965). See note 1 supra.
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and forced to pay for his care and maintenance even though he was
never formally convicted of a crime? Furthermore, the widespread
existence of recovery statutes such as Colorado's 1 and their importance to state fiscal structures 2 frame the issue in an even
broader context.
Thus, the constitutional issue before the Colorado Supreme
Court in this case had important policy implications regarding the
administration of state institutions, the administration of the criminal
justice system, and the protection of individual rights. That these
policy questions were not adequately considered by the court is
evidenced by its treatment (or nontreatment) of the equal protection argument, which was the basis of the probate court's decision.
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE

The basic constitutional question involved in Burnell was
whether a person found not guilty of a specific crime by reason of
insanity is reasonably classified apart from those who have been
convicted of crimes for purposes of according the two groups une.g., ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 257 (1958); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 5 (1957);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-121 (1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 26-3-17 (1956);

"See,

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 33-706 (1955);

VA. CODE ANN.

§ 37.1-105

(1950).

Some

statutes provide for payment by the ward and his estate only. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 5127(a) (1953) and § 5154 (Supp. 1966). Some statutes provide explicitly
that the expenses of convicts and criminally insane shall be borne by the state.
N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:4-78 (Supp. 1964). In some states a general liability provision
of the statutes provides for recovery from mental patients in general, while a separate
provision provides for payment by the state or county for those who are criminally
committed. Compare N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 24(2) with § 79 (McKinney
1951). In California a conflict between statutory provisions (CAL. WELF. & INST'NS
CODE § 6650 and § 6650.5 (West 1966)) was litigated and resolved in People v.
Brock, supra. That case held that a person adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity
at the time of the commission of the offense falls within the applicability of § 6650.5
which relieves him, his estate, and his relatives from liability for his care and maintenance.
12 The total amount collected from patients at the Colorado State Hospital during fiscal
year 1966-67 was $2,768,000. For fiscal year 1967-68, the total was $2,600,000. The
estimated revenue for fiscal year 1968-69 is $2,846,700. There are presently fewer
than 2,000 patients in the Colorado State Hospital, and the average monthly collection
per patient is approximately $130. Throughout the United States, state collections
range from 8 to 12 percent of the total cost of care and maintenance. Interview with
Matt McBride, Research Assistant, Colorado Dep't of Institutions, in Denver, Colorado, February 17, 1969. See generally STATE REIMBURSEMENT PROCEDURES FOR THE
MENTALLY ILL AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED, KANSAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PUB.

No. 261 (1967).
The maximum charge for patients in Colorado varies. As of July 1, 1966,
Burnell's estate was being charged at the rate of $390 per month. Brief in Support of
Motion to Deny Claim of Colorado State Hospital, In re Estate of Burnell, No.
P-31270 (P. Ct. Denver, Dec. 22, 1966), at 2. This rate of payment is slightly above
the median of all states. National Ass'n of Mental Health Directors, State Reimbursement Procedures for the Mentally Ill, as of March, 1967, Study No. 90 (March
6, 1968).
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equal treatment under the law- recovering the costs of care and
maintenance from one group and not recovering from the other.
The question might also be approached by asking whether or not the
criminally insane are reasonably included in the same class as the
civilly insane,13 since it would appear that the latter group may
be classified apart from the criminally convicted for purposes of
charging them for their care and maintenance.
An applicable classification test was set forth in earlier Colorado Supreme Court decisions in which it was said: "Equal Protection in its guaranty of like treatment to all similarly situated
permits classification which is reasonable and not arbitrary and
which is based upon substantial differences having a reasonable
relation to the objects or persons dealt with and to the public purpose sought to be achieved by the legislation involved."1 4 To apply
such a test to the present case, it must be determined whether the
criminally insane are similarly situated with those who are convicted
of crimes and whether their classification apart from the criminally
convicted is based upon substantial differences which have a reasonable relation to the persons dealt with and the public purpose sought
to be achieved by the legislation.
On the one hand, it can be argued that one who is adjudged
criminally insane is not similarly situated with one who has been
convicted of a crime. Arlester L. Burnell was never convicted of nor even tried for - a crime. He was institutionalized for a different
purpose than a convict would have been and, under the law,' 5
would be released upon different conditions. He is receiving rehabilitation rather than punishment and ought, by this reasoning,
to be held liable for the costs of the benefits conferred. These distinctions are rationally related to legitimate state purposes - for
the criminal, to protect the community from and to punish the offender; for the criminally insane, to provide him with services by
which he may regain his status as a productive member of society.
Furthermore, it can be argued that the criminally insane actually
13 The Colorado Supreme Court said, in dictum, that the classification of criminally
insane persons with civilly insane persons was reasonable: "The legislative classification grouped the criminally insane with all other persons who are adjudicated
mentally ill or mentally deficient. . . We see nothing unreasonable or unequal in
this classification." State v. Estate of Burnell, 439 P.2d 38, 40 (Colo. 1968).
14Champlin Refining Co. v. Cruse, 115 Colo. 329, 333, 173 P.2d 213, 215 (1946),
quoting from 12 Am. JuR. Constitutional Law § 469, at 131 (1938). See also
McCarty v. Goldstein, 151 Colo. 154, 158, 376 P.2d 691, 693 (1962), quoting from
Champlin Refining Co. v. Cruse, supra.
15 See notes 8, 9 supra and accompanying text.
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belong to the same class as the civilly insane, the only real difference
between the groups being in the method of commitment.' 6
On the other hand, it can be argued that there are substantial
similarities between the criminally insane and the criminally convicted which overshadow the minor differences between the two
groups. Both groups are confined for the protection of the populace
against a possible repetition of an unfortunate prior act. The confinement of both groups have similar punitive aspects, and, under
modern theories of penology, both groups receive some form of
rehabilitation therapy. Thus the probate court was
unable to indulge in the niceties which would distinguish between
persons sent to the penitentiary upon conviction of a crime and
those charged with a crime, but whose trial thereon for the substantive offense is barred by the finding of insanity. One superficial distinction, that the criminally insane are not usually confined
in the state penitentiary with ordinary prisoners, is due to a lack of
proper facilities for treating their mental illnesses. The state does
have the power, however, to imprison
the criminally insane in the
17
penitentiary if it chooses to do so.

It is not the purpose of this Comment to resolve this classification issue. It is the purpose rather to frame the issue in its broad
context and to suggest that the issue, so framed, was not adequately
resolved by the Colorado Supreme Court.
III. THE DECISION

The Colorado Supreme Court did not base its reversal upon
a resolution of the equal protection question as originally framed
in the probate court decision. Rather, it quoted the Colorado statute
allowing the state to recover from convicts by deducting from their
earnings' 8 and adopted the reasoning of counsel for the appellant
hospital that: "The real question before the Court is whether there
are sufficient distinctions between recovery of the cost for the
care and maintenance for each group in a different manner."' 9 The
16 In a civil commitment action, the process is initiated by a "reputable person" other
than the alleged incompetent. CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-5(1) and § 71-1-6
(Supp. 1965). Upon a finding by a court-appointed medical commission that the
respondent is mentally ill or mentally deficient, the court shall order his commitment.
Id. § 71-1-11.
In a criminal proceeding the process is initiated by a plea of "not guilty by
reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime" by the accused
himself. Id. § 39-8-1(1). Upon the making of such a plea, a jury is impaneled to
decide the insanity issue. Id. § 39-8.1 (3).
But see 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 605, 612 (1965) for a discussion of the "intrinsic
differences that can exist between a civil and criminal commitment."
17In re Estate of Burnell, No. P-31270 (P. Ct. Denver, Dec. 22, 1966), at 3.
18
COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 105-4-17 (1963).
19Brief of Plaintiffs in Error in Support of Application for Supersedeas at 7, State v.
Estate of Burnell, 439 P.2d 38 (Colo. 1968).
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court then quoted from a previous decision to the effect that:
- 'Courts will not interfere with the legislative classification unless
it appears that there is "no fair reason for the law [statute] that
would not equally require its extension to the accepted class." * *' "20
The court went on to hold that: "In making the distinction between
the method of recovering the costs of confining and maintaining
convicted criminals and of caring for and treating the criminally
insane . . . such difference is not unreasonable.''21
Although the reasoning of the court in the Burnell decision
is vague and unnecessarily complex, the logic of the decision appears
to have been as follows:
(1) The original question put to the court was, can the criminally insane be reasonably classified apart from the criminally
convicted for purposes of according them unequal treatment under
the law - unequal treatment being recovering costs from one group,
while not recovering from the other?
(2) The court's answer was that the state can recover from
the criminally convicted, only in a different manner. It assumes that
the two groups are thus accorded substantially equal treatment
under the law.
(3) Insofar as the manner of recovery differs, the distinctions
between the groups (the type and amount of costs expended for
them) justify the slightly different treatment under the law.
(4) Since the legal classification is thus reasonable, there is
no fair reason to prevent application of the insane recovery law
to the accepted- i.e., criminally insane - class.
Thus it would appear that by modifying the issue and basing
its decision upon the assumption that the criminally insane are accorded substantially equal treatment under the law, the court has
left the original classification question presented by this case substantially unresolved.
IV.

CRITIQUE OF THE DECISION

The decision which the court did make might be considered
questionable on the following grounds:
(1) Counsel for the estate, in a petition for rehearing, alleged
that no convict has in fact ever been billed for the cost of his maintenance at the penitentiary,2 2 and that actual discrimination in the
State v. Estate of Burnell, 439 P.2d 38, 39-40 (Colo. 1968), quoting from Driverless
Car Co. v. Armstrong, 91 Colo. 334, 338, 14 P.2d 1098, 1100 (1932) (emphasis
added). The significance of the word "accepted" is discussed at page 796 infra.
21 State v. Estate of Burnell, 439 P.2d 38, 40 (Colo. 1968).
22 Petition of Defendant in Error for Rehearing at 1, State v. Estate of Burnell, 439
P.2d 38 (Colo. 1968).
20
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method of administering a law is as potent a denial of equal protection as discrimination in the statute itself.2" This effectively challenges one of the key factual assumptions in the court's decision
-- that the state recovers from both groups.
24
(2) In quoting from Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong, the
court misconstrued the term "excepted class" to mean "accepted
class." That this metamorphosis was not a printer's error is evidenced by the fact that the word also appears as "accepted" in the
typed copy of the court's opinion contained in the original record.
It is further evidenced by the way the court appears to use the
rule in its decision. 5
(3) Even if the language had been correctly quoted, its applicability to the facts of the case is questionable. Tracing the
quoted language back to Watson v. Maryland,26 it can be seen that
the original meaning of the language referred to statutes which
contained questionable exceptions. The statute in question in Watson
was to the effect that: "All persons, except physicians who were
practicing medicine . . .shall make a written application for license

to the president of either board of medical examiners .... 27 The
headnote to this case phrased the holding as "nor will exceptions of
specified classes render the law unconstitutional unless there is no
fair reason for the law that would not equally require its extension
to the excepted class."2 It can be seen that the meaning of the rule
when placed in its original context does not appear to bear a
meaningful relationship to the way in which it has been subsequently
used.
In view of the complicated ambiguity 9 and the evasion of
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). See
16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 540 (1968).
2491 Colo. 334, 338, 14 P.2d 1098, 1100 (1932).
2Griffin

25 See analysis of the decision at page 795 supra.
26218 U.S. 173 (1910).
2 Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
28
1d. at 173.
2 This ambiguity is comparable to but not excused by the vagueness and ambiguity
which characterizes this area of the law in general. The following distinctions have
been at one time or another recognized by the courts and/or legislatures: (1) Whether
or not the insane person was civilly insane or criminally insane, State v. Estate of
Burnell, 439 P.2d 38 '(Colo.), cert. denied, 89 S.Ct. 46 (1968); (2) Whether or
not, within the class of criminally insane, the person was found not guilty by reason
of insanity or was unable to stand trial because of present insanity, People v. Brock,
57 Cal. 2d 644, 371 P.2d 296, 21 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1962) ; (3) Whether recovery was
sought from the estate of the insane person or from his relatives, Department of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964),
vacated and remanded, 380 U.S. 194, decision on remand, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d
321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965); (4) Whether the issue was the validity of legislative
classification of criminally and civilly insane together or separately, or legislative
classification of the criminally insane and criminally convicted together or separately,
409, 109
compare State v. Estate of Burnell, supra, with Kough v. Hoehler, 413 Ill.
N.E.2d 177 (1952), and see note 5 supra; and (5) Whether or not the statute
involved was challenged on the basis of an equal protection classification argument,
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the original constitutional issue put to the court, it is difficult to
make any definite statement about the practical effect of the
Burnell decision on Colorado law or subsequent decisions in other
jurisdictions. Perhaps a lower Colorado court or an appellate court
in another jurisdiction could legitimately avoid the apparent holding
of Burnell on the basis of reasoning such as that outlined above.
Even the dictum which the court expressed rests upon a logically
unsound basis: "Additionally, we believe the probate court erred in
classifying the criminally insane with those found guilty of crimes
and incarcerated in the state penitentiary. This classification cannot
be found in any legislative enactment. ' 30 The court is interpreting
the probate court's classification of criminally insane with criminally
convicted as inconsistent with the legislative classification. However,
the probate court made no such ruling, but, to the contrary, found
that the legislative classification was invalid as violative of the equal
protection clause.
The important issues inherent in the case being left thus unresolved by the Burnell decision, it is to be hoped that a subsequent
consideration of these issues will provide the law in this area with
a legally and logically sound precedent which recognizes the emerging issues of social policy concerning the penology of criminally
insane persons.
Darryl Kaneko
Karen Metzger
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United States v. Anderson, 17
U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968); Freed v. Baldi, 443 P.2d
716 (Colo. 1968).
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COURTS. -

In Anderson, the accused absented himself without authority
from his unit in Fort Polk, Louisiana, on November 3, 1964. On
February 10, 1967, he surrendered to civilian authorities and was
see note 4 supra and accompanying text. However, it is apparent that no court dealing
with one or more of these distinctions has recognized all of the distinctions, even
when they may have been relevant. Thus, all of the cases above cited are distinguishable on their facts, and no principle or principles of law articulated by these courts
adequately synthesize the varying fact situations into a logical structure.
30 State v. Estate of Burnell, 439 P.2d 38, 40 (Colo. 1968).
1Joint Resolution to Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in
Southeast Asia, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). The resolution was subsequently criticized by members of the Senate as not accurately reflecting the intent
of the Congress. Hearings on S.R. 151 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations
on United States Commitments to Foreign Powers, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 118, 132
(1967).

